Institutional aspects of performance measurement (PM) in public sector organizations are attracting increasing research interest. Only recently, however, has the literature on this topic recognized the pertinent critique of neo-institutional sociology (NIS) pivoting around its view of managers and organizations as primarily passive adaptors to change. This paper explores how the properties of institutional processes associated with recent reforms in the Norwegian health care sector impinge on the extent of pro-active choice exercised by senior management in the development of multidimensional PM reflecting the interests of a wider range of institutional constituencies. Addressing this issue, we draw on Oliver's (1991) conceptual framework, based on a continuum of responses characterized by a varying degree of pro-active choice. The study thus provides a more detailed analysis of the managerial tactics in developing organizational PM than most prior research informed by NIS. We find support for several of Oliver's hypotheses regarding the influence of institutional aspects, particularly those pertaining to the causes of the adoption of PM practices, the pattern in which these are diffused and the influence of constituency multiplicity and dependence, but also identify some areas requiring conceptual refinement in this respect.
Introduction
Over the past few years, management accounting researchers have paid increasing attention to the implications of public sector reforms for the design and implementa-tion of systems for performance measurement (PM) (e.g. Lapsley and Mitchell, 1996; Ballantine et al., 1998; Modell, 1998; Johnsen, 1999; Kloot and Martin, 2000) . Several authors have proposed a multidimensional approach to PM, reflecting the interests of a broader range of stakeholder interests, as a means of widening the conception of public sector performance from financial, efficiency-based measures (Mayston, 1985; Pollitt, 1986; Brignall, 1993; Ballantine et al., 1998; Kloot and Martin, 2000) . Much of this research has been informed by a functionalistic perspective where improved measurement and information systems are regarded as pivotal for assisting managers in making better informed trade-offs and thus balancing more or less conflicting stakeholder interests in the overall control of organizations. More recently, however, the considerable problems in achieving such a balance have stimulated some interest in neo-institutional sociology (NIS) as an alternative basis for exploring the premises impeding a wider conception of performance in public sector organizations (Llewellyn, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Lawton et al., 2000) .
The present paper extends these efforts to study PM from an NIS perspective by examining the responses of senior management and staff specialists to recent reforms in the public health care sector in Norway. While ample attention has been paid to the responses of operating-level employees and managers occupying dual professional and administrative roles to recent public sector reforms (e.g. Purdy, 1993; Pettersen, 1995; Jones and Dewing, 1997; Llewellyn, 1997; Jacobs, 1998; Llewellyn, 1998; Modell, 2000) , more in-depth investigations of the less extensively explored issues of how and why senior management influences PM in public sector organizations may provide important complementary insights. Some prior studies indicate that the development of novel PM practices and other formalized control mechanisms in response to public sector reforms tend to be dominated by senior management and staff specialists (Laughlin et al., 1994; Lawton et al., 2000) . In their capacity as systems designers, senior managers may thus function as translators of change through their interactions with the organization's institutional environment (cf. Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) , which may involve some arbitration between conflicting constituent interests (Brignall and Modell, 2000) .
Contrary to the assumptions invoked by much early theorizing in NIS, however, managers are not necessarily confined to passively comply with institutional pressures, but may possess much wider action repertoires involving a greater element of pro-active choice (see e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995; Beckert, 1999) . While this insight is spreading among management accounting scholars informed by NIS (e.g. Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Covaleski et al., 1996; Euske and Riccaboni, 1999) , no empirical study of multidimensional PM to date has systematically explored the responses of senior management along these lines. Given the capacity of PM to render visible the implications of public sector reforms for various organizational constituencies (cf. Brunsson, 1990; Broadbent, 1995) , senior management may need to exercise considerable caution in compiling performance information for the purpose of legitimization. Hence, pro-active and careful selection of indicators reflecting a broader range of financial and non-financial performance aspects of concern to key constituencies may be warranted to balance conflicting interests, although the institutional context of reforms is likely to pose some constraints in this respect (Brignall and Modell, 2000) .
Following the discussion in the foregoing, the overriding research question to be explored in this paper can be stated as follows: how do the properties of institutional processes associated with public sector reforms impinge on the extent of pro-active choice exercised by senior management in the development of PM? Addressing this question, we draw on Oliver's (1991) conceptual framework relating managerial responses to institutional processes. However, it is not our intention to 'test' Oliver's hypotheses in a conventional sense, but to use these as a theoretical 'skeleton' while 'fleshing out' and refining her theory through our empirical findings (Laughlin, 1995) . In the following section we outline Oliver's framework and relate it to the PM issues concerned in the empirical analysis. We then discuss the methodology applied, before presenting the case study findings. Finally, in the concluding section we sum up our main findings and discuss these in light of the theoretical issues previously raised. Oliver (1991) blended NIS, resource dependence and strategic choice theory to develop a conceptual framework allowing us to examine managerial responses to institutional processes while relaxing the assumption that these primarily follow a pattern of passive acquiescence in search for conformity and legitimacy. The framework thus provides a synthesis of the insights of the early NIS literature while accommodating some major criticisms levelled at this body of knowledge. Despite its comprehensiveness and systematic treatment of responses to institutional processes, the framework has not been widely applied in the management accounting literature. However, Abernethy and Chua (1996) used it to examine control systems redesign in the Australian health care sector and found support for several of Oliver's hypotheses. It would thus seem a promising analytical tool for addressing the research question posed in the present paper.
Managerial responses to institutional processes
Oliver identified a number of possible responses to institutional pressures ranging from relatively passive acquiescence to outright manipulation of influential constituencies and dominating norms and values (see Table 1 ). In between these extremes, she locates, among others, extensively documented responses to institutional processes, such as de-coupling of structural arrangements to cope with inconsistent constituent interests (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; Berry et al., 1985; Ansari and Euske, 1987) . As a strategy of avoidance, however, decoupling is susceptible to detection (Powell, 1988) and may need to be complemented with various concealment tactics.
As far as public sector PM is concerned, Lawton et al. (2000) report evidence of widespread acquiescence by senior management to governmental change initiatives. However, successful implementation of PM may require a certain element of decoupling between politically determined objectives and more specific performance indicators (Johnsen, 1999) . Meyer and Gupta (1994, p. 311) argued that 'coordination and control in organizations are best achieved through multiple, uncorrelated, and changing performance indicators that render it difficult to know exactly what performance is'. Following this line of reasoning, Brignall and Modell (2000) suggested that de-coupling of (as opposed to integration between) performance indicators reflecting conflicting constituent interests is a viable strategy for simultaneously legitimating public sector organizations to multiple constituencies, but requires a certain element of pro-active managerial manoeuvering to be successful. For example, in cases where political pressures for cost containment have a noticeably negative impact on quality, managerial resistance to demands for integration between financial measures reported to fund-granting bodies and quality indicators reflecting the interests of beneficiaries or professional staff may be required to reduce the possibilities of analysing interactions and trade-offs and thus avoid disruptive conflicts. Quality improvement efforts primarily reflecting a managerial rationale (e.g. TQM programmes) may also need to be de-coupled from actual quality control, as these are often based on a largely alien conception of quality to professional staff (Hersvik and Nesheim, 1995) , while they may still be useful for legitimating the organization to other constituencies (Westphal et al., 1997) .
The main focus of the present paper is on the various contextual factors associated with public sector reforms which influence the responses of senior management as regards PM. Oliver (1991) formulated 10 hypotheses reflecting the propensity for active resistance to institutional pressures, whereof six are directly relevant to our study. Similar to early NIS theorists, Oliver hypothesized that a major cause of adoption of structural attributes is the organizational quest for social legitimacy. However, she also recognized the competing hypothesis that perceived efficiency gains may be an equally important determinant of the adoption of structural attributes. Concerning the pattern in which institutional practices are diffused, Oliver distinguished between coercive pressures and voluntary diffusion, where the latter signifies somewhat weaker pressures for conformity stemming from mimetic or normative isomorphism (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . Both of these diffusion patterns were hypothesized to constrain the scope for active resistance to institutional pressures, but coercive pressures more so than voluntary diffusion. Finally, regarding the constituencies on which organizations depend for resources and legitimacy, Oliver hypothesized that the greater the multiplicity of constituencies with conflicting demands, the greater the likelihood of active resistance, but that increasing dependence on a dominant constituency would reduce resistance and constrain the ability to simultaneously conform to the interests of multiple constituencies.
Research method
The empirical study was carried out in a large Norwegian hospital, which has recently made relatively far-reaching adaptations to important institutional changes, primarily pertaining to the funding of health care. The collection of field data mainly took place in the first half of 1999 although our contacts with the hospital spanned a period of over one year. Data collection primarily comprised semi-structured interviews and archival data. A total of 21 interviews, generally lasting between 1 and 2 hours, were conducted.
Given the focus on senior management responses to reforms, we primarily selected interviewees in accordance with two criteria. First, we wished to ensure that a sufficiently large number of our informants represent a collective of managers, occupying relatively senior positions and functioning as 'absorbers' of recent reforms (cf. Laughlin et al., 1994; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) , while introducing some variation in the extent to which these reforms affect their areas of responsibility. 1 Second, we wished to identify managerial and administrative support staff actively involved in the design and use of performance indicators in response to recent reforms.
The first selection criterion directed our attention to the hospital's senior management team. The hospital is structured along divisional lines (see Figure 1) , with the managers of the seven divisions forming the hospital's senior management team (together with the General Manager and the heads of central administrative departments). While some divisional managers have a medical background (physicians and nurses), their role is primarily administrative. We interviewed all divisional managers (seven interviews) as well as the heads of the central finance, quality and personnel departments (three interviews). 2 Most of these interviews also met the second selection criterion. However, we complemented these by interviewing a number of staff specialists from the central administrative departments targeted (four interviews) and divisional controllers (four interviews), who are more directly concerned with devising performance indicators. As described in greater detail later in the paper, recent reforms of the funding of Norwegian health care have mainly affected clinical operations. By including managers and controllers of clinical as well as ancil-1 While the responses of such absorbing groups in terms of conformity with institutional pressures may vary considerably between organizations (Laughlin et al., 1994; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) , our study can be seen as an attempt to map such differences within the absorbing group of a single organization. 2 We concentrated our interest to these three administrative departments since they may be expected to deal extensively with performance aspects of primary interest to three key constituencies in a public sector context, namely funding bodies, beneficiaries and professional staff (cf. Brignall and Modell, 2000; Lawton et al., 2000) . lary divisions we thus hope to shed further light on how variations in the exposure to reforms affect internal developments in PM.
A problem in studying managerial responses to institutional processes is that these are not always made explicit and are, to some extent, sub-conscious. Managers do not form some value-free collective of actors, but are influenced by and influence the institutional environment in which they operate through intricate and often interwoven processes (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Crossan et al., 1999) . This requires the researcher to adopt an interpretive approach, examining the symbolic meanings attached to PM and, most importantly, linking these to the context in which they are formed. Following the research design outlined above, this contextual framing is achieved by structuring our analysis around two major themes, namely the performance information used by our informants in response to institutional pressures linked to the interests of various key constituencies (see Section 6; cf. Brignall and Modell, 2000) and similarities and differences across divisions in this respect (see Section 7) .
Understanding managerial responses to institutional processes may also require the researcher to go beyond interview data by complementing these often rationalized accounts of the evolution of organizational events with observations of management in action (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) . We had some opportunities to observe the actions of senior management in conjunction with public appearances (e.g. workshops and seminars) and through the analysis of media statements. This allowed us to assess the degree of consistency between interviewee accounts and managerial actions when confronting various constituencies in public. In addition, preliminary results of our analysis were presented to a larger number of informants at a feedback seminar and the influence of institutional factors of particular interest was followed up in informal discussions with a more limited number of key informants at several occasions during the autumn of 1999 and the spring of 2000 (cf. Yin, 1984) . The discussions evolving at these occasions proved particularly valuable as a means of cross-validating our initial interpretations of the managerial responses to recent changes in the system of funding and the tactics applied in dealing with the growing pressures from professional staff. Hence, our final interpretations emerged through a certain amount of dialogue between the researcher and the researched, as advocated by Laughlin (1995) .
A potential limitation of the study is that little data reflecting the subjective views of actors other than senior managers and staff specialists were collected. A few interviews with representatives of potentially influential institutional actors (e.g. trade unions, regional government) were conducted and used for corroborating emerging researcher interpretations of issues of particular interest (e.g. managerial responses to the new system of funding, the problems of implementing more formalized quality indicators). Furthermore, official documents provided some insights into the views of central government underpinning recent reforms. Given the focus on senior management responses to institutional processes, however, it was judged appropriate to concentrate the interviews to this category of actors. To enhance the reader's understanding of the context of reforms, the presentation of case data is preceded by an overview of current developments in the Norwegian health care sector.
Recent reforms in the Norwegian health care sector
At the regional level, Norwegian health care is primarily organized within a number of independent county councils. However, county councils have relatively limited discretion in financing decisions and regional tax rates are undifferentiated and determined by central government (Sørensen, 1997) . Moreover, an increasing part of the funding of health care is currently subject to increasingly centralized control. For example, the amount of 'earmarked' funds for specific tasks (e.g. psychiatric care) flowing directly from central government is increasing. The new funding system for in-patients implemented in July 1997 (described in greater detail below) also reflects this centralizing tendency of current reforms.
From the early 1980s to 1996 hospital costs were primarily covered by fixed global budgets, adjusted for price changes in input factors. However, a number of dysfunctional effects attributable to this system of funding have been observed (Bjørnenak and Pettersen, 1999) . The system provided little incentive for reducing costs and systematic budgetary overruns were allegedly used as a means of legitimizing increasing spending on health care (see also, Pettersen, 1995) . Furthermore, waiting lists grew dramatically in the period as the system gave hospitals an incentive to increase the number of out-patients at the expense of in-patients.
Experiments with prospective payment based on the classification of patients into diagnosis related groups (DRGs) were undertaken in the early 1990s. However, the system devised for this purpose encountered considerable implementation problems due to its technical complexity and the difficulties in legitimating its use to clinical staff (Mellemvik and Pettersen, 1998; Pettersen, 1999) . Furthermore, no clear differences in efficiency between the experimental and reference hospitals could be observed (Pettersen, 1999) . Despite these experiences, a similar system of funding was introduced on a nation-wide basis in 1997. Funding of in-patient treatment was now linked to activity levels calculated as a DRG score per hospital stay, reflecting differences in the estimated needs and patterns of resource consumption between patient groups. DRG scores are thus intended to represent proxies for the costs of treatment. These scores are subsequently aggregated and transformed into cost indexes forming the basis for direct allocation of government grants to county councils, partly replacing fixed grants and global budgets (Bjørnenak and Pettersen, 1999 ). Each county council may then choose whether to extend this funding logic to the hospital level. As of January 2000, all county councils have taken steps in this direction. However, central government has taken a cautious official approach to extending the funding logic within hospitals and has few possibilities to dictate such practices to hospitals (cf. Opedal, 2000) .
The role of DRGs in PM is most obvious in the context of comparisons across hospitals and county councils. A large number performance indicators (e.g. DRGbased costs per hospital stay, average length of hospital stays, number of hospital stays per bed) are compiled annually by an independent research institute on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Affairs. These are subsequently used by central government to allocate resources to the county councils in proportion to the needs of their clientele (as reflected by composite DRG indexes) and production increases. Composite DRG-indexes for hospitals are also published annually and receive considerable attention as comparative indicators of cost efficiency in the media. 3 As far as central government is concerned, a clearly articulated aim of the new system of funding has been to strengthen the incentives for production increases and so improve patient throughput and shorten waiting lists by linking the allocation of funds to increases in DRG-based activity levels (Bjørnenak and Pettersen, 1999) . Prospective payment was seen as complementary to the waiting list warranties introduced in the mid-1990s imposing maximum limits on waiting times for elective care (Bjørnenak et al., 2000) . However, actual costs have increased more rapidly than production since the introduction of nation-wide prospective payment and a dramatic drop in productivity occurred after the introduction of prospective payment in 1997 (Bjørnenak and Pettersen, 1999) . Furthermore, most large hospitals reported substantial budgetary overruns in 1999 and at the end of the year the media generally described the situation in the health care sector as a 'major crisis' (Bjørnenak et al., 2000) .
One important reason for the decreasing productivity in the Norwegian health care sector is the considerable salary increases, particularly for physicians, in recent years. Furthermore, growing production is frequently very costly due to the increasingly severe shortage of staff and the subsequent utilization of overtime to accommodate production increases and dealing with production bottle-necks (Bjørnenak et al., 2000) . However, the budgetary overruns reported in 1999 may also be ascribed, in part, to mechanisms embedded in the new system of funding. To reduce the incentives for increasing revenues by 'creative' coding of patients, central government has made final DRG-based reimbursements contingent on hospitals' ability to stay within specific limits for DRG-creeping, expressed in terms of changes in composite DRG indexes. DRG-creeping implies that patients are placed in DRGs yielding a higher standard price than that justified by their actual health status (Bjørnenak et al., 2000) .
For several large hospitals (including the one under study), DRG-based reimbursements were adjusted downwards at the end of the year compared to the budgeted level of funding with reference to DRG-creeping in 1999. At the same time, substantial changes in coding procedures and DRG weights were initiated by central government. Taken together, this produced considerable uncertainty regarding the actual size of DRG-based reimbursements, making planning and budgeting at the hospital level increasingly difficult (Bjørnenak et al., 2000; Opedal, 2000) . In addition, there are often significant local discrepancies between DRG-based reimbursements and actual resource utilization due to deviations in the clientele from the national averages underpinning DRG weights, although local adjustments of DRG weights are being made (Bjørnenak and Pettersen, 1999; Bjørnenak et al., 2000) .
After the present study was completed (end of 2000), central government issued a proposal to transfer ownership of all hospitals from county councils to the state. The proposal was presented as a means of taking more forceful action in dealing with the escalating 'crisis' in the health care sector. This would reinforce the centralizing tendencies noted above and increase the dependence of health care institutions on the state. However, it is not an altogether surprising step considering the eroding popular legitimacy of Norwegian county councils observed in recent years (see Sørensen, 1997) 
Performance measurement and control practices in the case hospital
The hospital under study is one of the largest in the country, providing a broad range of specialities. It operates under county council governance, but has a relatively autonomous position. From 1995 departments have been grouped together into seven divisions, whereof four encompass clinical units and three cover various ancillary operations (laboratories, medical and technical support services; see Figure 1 ). With some exceptions (e.g. the psychiatric division) there are relatively complex interdependencies between these divisions. Internal PM is primarily geared at the divisional level, while the heads of divisions have overall responsibility for budgeting and coordination within and between divisions. In recent years, the hospital has performed very well in the annual comparisons of composite DRG indexes indicating that it is one of the most cost effective hospitals in the country in its category. Relatively minor deviations from budget were reported in the years preceding the present study, but a substantial budgetary overrun occurred in 1999. A major cause of this was the downward adjustment of DRG-based reimbursement due to alleged DRG creeping. However, the hospital is also experiencing growing recruitment and retention problems, particularly for nurses and various types of specialist functions, which lead to increasing costs due to the overtime needed to increase production and alleviate production bottle-necks. This section provides a brief 'factual' account of the development of PM and control practices within the hospital as a backdrop to the subsequent sections, which analyse the more subjective views of our informants in accordance with the methodological approach outlined in the foregoing.
Departmental budgets were introduced in the 1970s. However, these have traditionally taken the form of cash limits, with departments forming cost centres mainly responsible for staff-and materials-related expenses. DRGs were introduced in the early 1990s, as the hospital took part in the initial experiments with prospective payment. It is only recently (1998/99), however, that departmental budgeting has been more closely linked to clinical activities through the allocation of financial resources based on DRG scores, partly substituting other revenue sources (as described in greater detail below). Historically, the compilation of comparable measures of resource utilization linking financial data to activity levels (e.g. number of in-days or treated patients) has presented a major problem, given the significant variations in patient needs and differentiation between departments.
Following the national introduction of prospective payment, DRG-based reimbursements have been allocated to the hospital from the County Council since 1998. However, only 50 per cent of the total DRG-based reimbursement is allocated to the hospital due to the risk of over-emphasis on the generation of such revenues at the expense of care, which is less favoured by this system of funding (e.g. out-patients). Consequently, a significant part of the costs of in-patient treatment is still covered by fixed grants and a staff specialist at the county council level expressed concerns regarding the difficulties involved in detecting cases of cross-subsidization between DRG-indexed patients and activities not covered by the new system of funding. The costs of treating other categories of patients (e.g. out-patients, visiting patients from other county councils) are primarily covered by fixed grants, patient fees and charges to other health care institutions. There are also earmarked grants compensating for specific functions assigned to the hospital (e.g. regional hospital function, research and teaching).
As of 1999, the hospital has extended the new funding logic to the divisional and departmental level through the introduction of a DRG-based allocation mechanism. The hospital is one of the first in the country to implement such internal allocation practices, the aim of which is to match revenues with the estimated use of resources attributable to DRG-indexed patients in both clinical and ancillary departments. Whereas DRG-based reimbursements are directly traceable to clinical units where patients are treated, it is considerably more difficult to apportion such revenues to ancillary departments. The new allocation practices imply that a portion of the DRGbased reimbursements is distributed in proportion to the average use of ancillary services linked to the treatment of different categories of patients. The mechanism devised for this purpose is largely based on national standards for DRG weights, although considerable adjustments of these weights have been undertaken by the hospital's finance department. However, the costs of ancillary services are primarily covered by fixed grants except where services are provided to external parties (e.g. certain laboratory services, laundry and catering services). Certain ancillary services, particularly within the laboratory and technical support divisions are increasingly exposed to competitive pressures as a result of increasing sales to external customers, tendering and outsourcing.
Continuous financial performance evaluation of and within divisions is undertaken on a monthly basis and primarily focuses on budgetary deviations and comparisons between outcomes and divisional prognoses. Prior to the introduction of DRGs, financial PM within the hospital pivoted around relatively aggregated measures linking costs to the number of beds, in-days, treated patients or other crude indicators of activity levels and the development of different types of revenues (e.g. out-patient fees, charges to external parties pertaining to visiting patients and provision of ancillary services). However, various DRG-based indicators (see Table 2 ) have been developed since the early 1990s and are increasingly used for continuous evaluation of clinical operations alongside the information previously relied upon. Several of these measures are also aggregated for the hospital as a whole and are used for annual comparisons with similar hospitals in accordance with national guidelines. However, the aggregation of DRG-based measures requires significant adjustments to achieve comparability. Composite DRG indexes (from 1993). Number of DRG-indexed stays (from 1993). Length of departmental stays (for normal, longer and total stays per DRG). Average length of departmental stays-i.e. proportion of normal and longer stays (DRG-based). Proportion of diagnostic and procedural codes used (% ), (from 1993). Number of DRGs used (from 1993).
Another critical performance indicator, according to some central staff specialists, is whether clinical departments are able to meet the national standards for waiting lists. While this measure, in combination with budgetary performance and activity levels, seem to be relatively tightly monitored by the finance department, they are rarely explicitly linked to continuous evaluation of other non-financial measures (e.g. indicators of quality, staff utilization, employee well-being) at higher levels. This was partly attributed to the disintegrated and incompatible information systems relied upon by the accounting, quality and personnel departments. However, there appear to have been relatively limited efforts to develop non-financial indicators for organization-wide use and the head of the finance department argued that there was 'a huge potential to develop quality indicators'.
The hospital's quality department has initiated a project aimed at devising more formalized quality measures for clinical divisions as part of a TQM programme launched in the mid-1990s. At the time of our study, however, the only quality indicators regularly reported from the divisions to the quality department were measures of infection rates and patient injuries. Some of these indicators are requested by influential external parties (state agencies) but we found no evidence of them being used for internal control within any of the divisions. More extensive surveys of patient-perceived quality have only been carried out twice (1996 and 1999) and have then been the responsibility of external consultants conducting corresponding studies in a number of other hospitals. Neither have employee attitudes been followed up on a systematic basis, although a staff satisfaction survey similar to that targeting patient-perceived quality was carried out by external consultants in the spring of 1999. The personnel department compiles extensive staff statistics and monitors more easily measurable performance aspects such as the number of positions, utilization of overtime and absenteeism on a regular basis, but this information is rarely used as an integral part of the more broadly based evaluations of divisions and departments.
According to a staff specialist in the finance department, the lack of integration of staff data with finance was a 'big problem', as manpower planning is based on national staffing norms (e.g. fixed number of nurses per sets of beds) rather than actual activity levels. This occasionally exacerbates production bottlenecks and has adverse implications for patient waiting times. Similarly, the head of the personnel department argued that:
The work of the personnel department should be guided more by operating activities. . . . We have to assess the need for competence in relation to activities rather than the number of positions in place. . . . In the nursing area, one problem is that we have increased basic staff levels but we have not considered the implications of sick-leave, extra help, overtime and competence development.
(Head of Personnel Department)
To overcome the problem of disintegrated information systems, the County Council has developed new accounting and personnel information systems, which were being implemented across all hospitals in the county at the time of the study. These were said to provide an opportunity for closer integration of financial, activity-based (e.g. DRG) and staff-related data. However, the systems were not fully operational at the time of our study.
Responses pertaining to the interests of key constituencies
The implementation of DRG-based PM An overall impression from the interviews with members of the senior management team is that the development since the mid-1990s has been characterized by growing concerns with improving financial PM and control. The General Manager of the hospital, appointed in 1993, appears to have taken on a leading role in this process. A major initiative largely ascribed to him was the implementation of the divisional structure in 1995, leading to increasing decentralization of budgetary control through the appointment of divisional controllers working closer to operating departments. Two officially stated reasons for this reorganization, which also surfaced in several interviews, were to reduce the General Manager's span of control and improve budgetary control. Several interviewees argued that the restructuring had subsequently reinforced the focus on continuous financial PM and evaluation.
Despite the relatively stable financial situation of the hospital prior to the introduction of resource allocation based on DRGs, the difficulties in linking financial resources to activity levels seemed to present a legitimization problem to the hospital as there is some need to make such linkages visible to external constituencies. As far as PM is concerned, this especially appears to be the case when budgetary overruns are reported, as this triggers some concerns at the county council level with the ability to demonstrate compliance with the cost containment ethos. Although the budgetary deviations were relatively limited during the years preceding the present study, a staff specialist in the finance department argued that:
There's great variation in the realism of budgetary targets due to the tactics involved in accounting. . . . The County Council wants to know where the deficit for the hospital has been incurred and what can be done about it. It's a delicate balance between what to account for internally and externally. We have to reach an agreement with the County Council regarding which deficits to show internally.
(Staff Specialist in Finance Department)
For the purpose of external reporting, such negotiations with the County Council often seem to result in relatively arbitrary PM practices as a sizeable proportion of (untraceable) costs is allocated to the medical division where, as one interviewee put it, 'politicians know that there is always a problem', while another suggested that 'these problems have never been properly analysed'. There were suggestions, however, that the need for arbitrary ex-post allocations primarily stemmed from the County Council's negotiations with central government for funding, while the County Council itself was said to 'exercise no real cost control'.
The uncertainty stemming from politically negotiated PM seemed to present serious concerns to central staff specialists, particularly in the finance department, who expressed great hopes that the DRG system would reduce the arbitrariness of financial PM, as it provided a 'better overview' and a 'better picture of the link between activities and finance'. Furthermore, the head of the finance department argued that:
When DRGs were introduced they had little effect . . . the reason why we are now using DRGs for cost allocations is that we want to introduce the incentives built into the system [of funding] internally. We want to reward those departments increasing production and treating more patients.
(Head of Finance Department)
Similarly, another staff specialist argued that an important aim of DRG-based allocations and PM was to motivate clinician-managers to 'link activities to finance'. In addition to such explanations, however, there were references to the importance of these practices to 'make activities visible' to politicians. Yet, the external pressures on the hospital to use the new system of funding for internal control seem to have been relatively limited. For example, a staff specialist at the county council level deemphasized the use of DRGs for PM, arguing that:
We have not seen any significant advantages of implementing the new system of funding at the departmental level. The initiative has come from the hospital. . . . One problem with DRGs is that they are based on large populations of patients. It is not always easy to compare [costs] between different hospitals. There can be large differences in the clientele within the same DRG. . . . Even if DRG is the only thing we have [to evaluate] somatic care today, it is difficult to use it in a meaningful manner.
(Staff Specialist at County Council Level)
It should also be recalled that central government has not had the ambition to force individual hospitals to rely on the prospective payment logic for internal control (cf. Opedal, 2000) . Although one interviewee argued that the new system of funding implied that 'the County Council is losing some power to the state', none of our informants attributed the decision to use the DRG-based system for internal resource allocation to pressures directly emanating from central government or the County Council. Staff specialists within the hospital as well as at higher levels of the County Council rather ascribed this to the hospital's General Manager. The General Manager has also positioned himself as a strong public advocate of using the DRG-based system for internal control, using his own hospital as an illustrative example. When confronted with critical remarks regarding the prospective payment system at a public seminar, the General Manager revealed a defensive attitude and argued that although the system was not perfect it was far better than the system for internal financial control previously used. However, the head of the hospital's finance department claimed to have favoured postponing its implementation at the departmental level due to the considerable changes, which were under way in national DRG weights and coding procedures. Despite such concerns with premature implementation of the DRG-based system for internal resource allocation, there were suggestions that the General Manager had motivated the introduction of such practices by arguments such as 'let's start using it now and we will have solved the problems in five years' time'. There were also suggestions that the use of DRGs might become even more important for the purpose of pricing in the future as some type of internal market for health services was considered a likely consequence of the current wave of reforms. Hence, what we observe here is an attempt by management to go beyond what is currently demanded by powerful institutional actors (i.e. central government) and to use DRGs for internal control, possibly as a means of preparing for more far-reaching changes in the system of governance. It is also opportune to recall that the hospital has fared very well in comparisons with other hospitals' DRGbased performance, receiving extensive coverage in the media, and thus appears to have little to lose by stressing its importance. A staff specialist in the finance department argued that:
The hospital has a fair amount of goodwill through the annual surveys [i.e. the comparison of composite DRG indexes] showing that we are the most cost effective in the country.
(Staff Specialist in Finance Department)
There were also suggestions that the hospital's comparatively low scores in composite DRG indexes were potentially useful in the budgetary dialogue with political levels, as they provide some ground for arguing that the hospital should be rewarded (rather than punished) for its continuously high cost efficiency. 4 DRGs can thus be seen as a mechanism for managing the hospital's relations with important institutional actors, while efforts are also expended on making them an integral part of the control of operations.
Central staff specialists, particularly in the finance department, generally expressed positive attitudes to the use of DRGs for internal control, arguing that it would probably improve financial control in the longer term. Yet, there were frequent remarks regarding the considerable amount of work and complexities involved in making DRGs useful for internal control. Regarding the DRG-based allocations in the 1999 budget, the staff specialist in charge of developing the mechanism for this purpose argued that:
. . . we had very little time to produce the key for allocations. Otherwise we would have calculated DRG-based cost weights more precisely. We did not have the time to do this and the key for allocations must be adjusted as we go along. However, it is not easy to measure the ancillary divisions' activities linked to other departments exactly.
Even though the allocation mechanism has been refined during 1999, a considerable amount of work appears to be required to 'translate' the national DRG-weights to indicators reflecting operating realities within the hospital, not least because of the considerable changes in coding procedures simultaneously initiated by central government. Furthermore, as the budgetary overrun grew during the autumn of 1999, partly as a result of alleged DRG-creeping, some of our informants seemed largely preoccupied with tracing and explaining the causes of this overrun to the County Council. The head of the finance department, for example, claimed in informal discussions to have little time left for other duties during this period.
Managing staff interests
The implementation of DRG-based PM has progressed in isolation from the development of indicators reflecting the interests of employees. Furthermore, there was little evidence of staff-related performance indicators (e.g. staffing levels, absenteeism, staff turnover) playing any greater legitimating role although staff aspects are becoming increasingly important. The head of the personnel department reinforced the impression of human resource aspects being of less importance for external legitimization by saying that 'the work of the personnel department is mainly internally orientated'. He further argued that the strategic significance of human resources had only recently been more widely acknowledged in the hospital. Despite the growing recruitment and retention problems, human resource management was said to have been regarded as a 'necessary evil'. Furthermore, there seemed to be some barriers to cooperation between the personnel and finance departments, as indicated by a staff specialist in the former department:
Even if there is some mutual respect between us and the finance department, there is not much cooperation. There is no tradition of cooperation, it mainly concerns the creation of new positions. When I started here, the personnel department had low status internally. . . . More cooperation at lower levels is required. The heads of the [personnel and finance] departments come together at management team meetings, so we do not need more managerial forums. There is a risk, however, that the managers would then feel marginalized and lose status. We have a choice here-either we try to achieve some results or we safeguard status.
(Staff Specialist in Personnel Department)
Similarly, the head of the personnel department stated that:
I think the personnel and finance department should cooperate more. Our [current] cooperation works well, but the finance department only focuses on finance and activities.
Referring to the implementation of the new, integrated information systems initiated by the County Council, he added:
The question is how we could link these [staff-related data] to DRGs. It only works if the finance, quality and personnel department cooperate better.
(Head of Personnel Department)
There appeared to be some tension, however, between the focus on financial PM and performance aspects of more immediate interest to staff. A staff specialist in the finance department, for example, argued that various professional groups question the merits of top scores in financial ratings suspecting that these are achieved at the expense of re-investment of funds in operations. While the present study was undertaken, this tension became acutely felt, as the staff satisfaction survey conducted by external consultants revealed widespread discontent and fatigue. This was in large measure ascribed to the financial performance pressures. The results received extensive coverage in local newspapers and sparked a political debate regarding the governance status of the hospital, with some political parties demanding improved external control. Other political parties proclaimed that:
Financially, [the hospital] has coped in an exemplary manner. As far as personnel are concerned, however, the report shows that there is a lot to do. We are very interested in what measures management will take.
(Newspaper Excerpt)
The General Manager reacted promptly by stating that he regarded the findings as 'very serious' and promising to take immediate steps to improve the situation when interviewed in the media. However, he did not explicitly link the issue of staff fatigue and retention to the internal emphasis on DRGs and financial PM, but focused specifically on the more concrete issues at hand in responding to the media. As the interviews were followed up through more informal discussions it became clear that this was also the strategy adopted for dealing with the problem internally. The General Manager summoned a meeting with representatives from the departments experiencing greatest problems according to the report to sort out the steps necessary to improve work conditions and assigned additional 'earmarked' resources for this purpose. There were also suggestions that increasing pressure had been put on the quality department, which administered the staff satisfaction survey, to step up the efforts to develop indicators of absenteeism and staff turnover.
Managing quality aspects
Another indication of the role of the quality department in managing issues of institutional significance is the fact that the only quality indicators (e.g. infection rates, patient injuries) systematically reported from the divisions are those requested by influential external actors (state agencies). The quality department has been built up to a size of over 10 employees in just a few years and the focus on quality was said to be growing as a result of a more general trend in the public sector. However, even though extensive training programmes for improving quality management at the departmental level have been launched and attempts to develop quality indicators for internal use are under way, the head of the quality department argued that:
We only use [quality] indicators at an aggregated level. I don't know what the information is used for or what measurement systems there may be at lower levels. We measure every quarter, but then it mainly ends up in the closet. Departments report data but get no feedback. They don't have any ownership relation to the information since it's always someone else who is requesting it. They do not see the need for it themselves.
(Head of Quality Department)
The limited progress in implementing formalized quality measurement at lower levels was also attributed to the considerable professional resistance to 'alien' quality management techniques based on standardized TQM principles, particularly among physicians. Quality was claimed to be 'something that doctors say they have always been striving for' while a staff specialists in the quality department suggested that:
The problem is that doctors wish to have some monopoly when it comes to medical thinking, while quality management is very much a matter of sharing knowledge with others. Convincing the doctors is the key to change. . . . There is a conflict of interests both vertically and horizontally. There is often too little communication and dissemination of information downwards through the organization. It's a question of power, no doubt! . . . The [trade] union is [also] a brake block . . . it is more concerned with preserving the established system.
(Staff Specialist in Quality Department)
There were also more blunt suggestions indicating that patient and staff interests are not necessarily congruent:
There is too little awareness of patients' rights. Increased patient orientation would be good. . . . Managers at all levels need to be aware of the tensions between staff-and patient-related legislation. Sometimes, the demands based on these are so conflicting that the whole system becomes schizophrenic.
(Manager of Medical Support Division)
As indicated by a trade union representative, however, the implementation mode underpinning the quality improvement efforts also appeared to contribute to the resistance:
There has been a lot of irritation due to the way [the quality improvement efforts] were initiated. It seems like someone higher up in the hierarchy suddenly realizes that there is something called quality, but evaluations of operations are carried out continuously. It would have been easier if the point of departure had been formulated by the collegiate. Using examples from a car factory in Detroit isn't particularly tasteful. . . . Resistance is not so much due to suspicions of what's coming from above. There's an element of that but the point is the way the whole thing has been managed. It needs to be linked closer to the health care environment. . . . There's also some concern regarding the considerable build-up of a whole staff unit for quality assurance.
(Representative of Physicians' Trade Union)
Senior management and certain professional groups would thus appear to espouse relatively diverging interpretations of what constitutes acceptable quality management techniques. This divide became even more obvious in the interview with the head of the quality department. Commenting on the primary content of the current quality improvement efforts, she stated that:
It's a matter of looking at one's own operations and reducing non-value adding activities. As part of this work we have also introduced systems for deviation analysis and quality auditors and we have started to devise quality indicators. The quality measures we're primarily trying to develop are indicators of availability, cost effectiveness and continuity.
(Head of Quality Department)
This quote features some vestiges of the alleged top-down approach to quality management (e.g. the emphasis on deviation analysis and quality auditors). Furthermore, quality improvement is partly couched in a language reminding us of the quest for financial probity, such as 'cost effectiveness' and 'reduction of non-value adding activities'. The head of the quality department also confirmed that the quality improvement efforts were primarily inspired by private sector practices (modern TQM thinking), although she claimed that the necessary adjustments to a health care setting had been made.
Similarities and differences across divisions
The interview findings concerning control issues within the seven divisions generally confirmed that financial PM and control had become increasingly pronounced in recent years, partly due to the greater reliance on DRG-based controls. Some interviewees described the allocation of DRG-based reimbursements as a step towards transforming departments into 'profit centres'. In principle, the managers and controllers of the three clinical divisions welcomed these control practices since, as one of them put it:
What is positive about budgets based on DRGs is that the departmental managers get obvious revenues based on activities that they have proposed themselves. This way, we can avoid excuses like budgets based on activities being unrealistic. Earlier we have only been able to report to the General Manager that we cannot stay within budget since the activity levels are unrealistic. [Prospective payment] results in a better control mechanism. . . . We would soon lose our credibility to the departments if the budget was consistently perceived as unrealistic.
(Controller in Head/Throat Division)
Yet, considerable problems in matching revenues with costs remain. Even though the national DRG scores provide reasonably good proxies for actual costs over larger populations, a divisional manager argued that:
One problem is that [DRG-based] prices are not always realistic. . . . Actual costs do not always correspond to the DRG-based reimbursements.
(Manager of Surgery/Oncology Division)
In addition, the DRG-based information received from higher levels was said to be too aggregated and a considerable amount of work seems to be required to disaggregate and adjust data for use at the departmental level. Referring to these problems, a divisional controller argued that:
The budgeted activity levels are now based on DRG scores for the department as a whole. There may be significant variations in DRGs within particular departments, though, and we should go into greater detail here. . . . This year, we have made adjustments [of the budget] for prospective payment revenues, [but] we have had to calculate the activity levels for this for each department ourselves. Budgeting at the post level [within departments] becomes a terrible puzzle.
(Controller in Medical Division)
Despite such technical problems, however, we found broad agreement that DRGs might improve financial control among managers and controllers of clinical divisions. By contrast, we found more widespread concerns with and objections to the use of DRGs for resource allocation in ancillary divisions although these are less directly affected by DRG-based PM. Criticisms primarily pivoted around the crude proxies for allocating a portion of DRG-based reimbursements to ancillary divisions and their dependence on clinical operations. While acknowledging that there may be some long-term benefits, such as greater cost consciousness, the head of the laboratory division stated that DRG-based allocations 'depend on other departments' ability to increase production. . . . DRG-based revenues are not fully controllable to the laboratory departments'.
Irrespective of these differences between clinical and ancillary divisions, however, informants in both types of divisions emphasized the general merits of DRG-based PM for external legitimization in a similar fashion to staff at higher levels of the organization. In particular, there were concerns that the more rudimentary financial PM practices previously relied upon might not be viable for this purpose in the future, combined with calls for more stringent accountability, or as one divisional controller put it:
In the future, inhabitants won't accept the lack of information about how resources are being used and what the effects of health care are. The way it's been so far, deficits have been used for justifying additional funding. . . . Greater emphasis should be placed on the link between activities, weighted patient needs and financial results. (Controller in Laboratory Division) Similarly, the controller in a clinical division argued that one advantage of the more obvious link between finance and activities embedded in DRG-based PM was that 'we have to be able to respond to what goes into the tertial reports going to the County Council'. The head of the technical support division also argued that the introduction of DRG-based indicators had reduced the element of ad-hoc political intervention in hospital control since they provided a more 'rational' representation of hospital performance than the crude financial measures previously used.
Given the research design, we were particularly interested in assessing whether the differences in how DRG-based PM and control affect clinical and ancillary divisions could be linked to broader developments in PM practices within the divisions. As far as clinical divisions are concerned, the enhanced emphasis on DRGs appeared to divert attention from other significant changes in the hospital's control system. While there were widespread complaints regarding the limited involvement in the design and implementation of the new information system and suggestions that this had been hampered by the County Council's striving for uniformity across hospitals, some interviewees also admitted that the considerable work associated with the introduction of DRG-based allocations had limited their involvement. A divisional controller summed up her frustration over this by saying that:
Even though we have to start some time, it would have been wise to postpone the implementation [of DRG-based allocations] within the hospital till 2000. Now, it clashes with the implementation of the new accounting system which is completely crazy.
(Controller in the Head/Throat Division) Similarly, one of her colleagues, more involved in the development of the new, integrated information systems, complained about how the workload associated with the implementation of DRG-based PM diverted attention from these efforts, arguing that:
There are extensive on-going efforts by central government to adjust DRG weights, which has lead to several new codes being introduced after the end of the year. . . . It [the DRG system] is becoming too complex and many people are longing back to the days when we only had a frame budget. Such requests are coming from below. There are lots of novelties to consider, but we have to make the best of the situation.
(Controller in the Medical Division)
These attention-and effort-absorbing effects of DRG-based PM are also mirrored by the limited efforts to develop non-financial performance indicators reflecting operating conditions or quality aspects in clinical divisions. Divisional managers and controllers seemed to rely primarily on indicators generated by the separate patient and personnel information systems (e.g. waiting list and occupancy ratio statistics and measures of staff turnover and absence) and regularly received from central administrative departments. Although there were frequent concerns with the quality and reliability of these indicators and the lack of integration between information systems, we observed few pro-active attempts to develop local performance indicators to improve control.
In contrast, greater efforts to develop local performance measures are made in some of the ancillary divisions. The most ambitious attempts in this direction were observed in the technical support division, where the divisional controller has developed various activity-based indicators more closely tailored to the operations of each department (see Table 3 ). The local information system devised for compiling these is also complemented with information regarding the number of bed-days for the hospital as a whole, as this constitutes an important determinant of the volume of service provided to clinical departments. The controller commented on the reasons for developing these measures by saying that:
The accounting system isn't good enough. . . . It's very unwieldy and more of a financial system. There is no link between finance and activities and we can only extract standard reports.
(Controller in Technical Support Division)
It should be noted that the indicators listed in Table 3 are mainly based on internal production data and do not primarily reflect concerns with legitimacy in the eyes of external constituencies. Ancillary divisions are not completely buffered from external institutional pressures to compile performance indicators, but the driving forces in this respect differ from those at work in clinical divisions. In the laboratory division, for example, the impetus for developing non-financial indicators appeared to stem from the greater exposure to competitive market conditions, or as the divisional controller explained: Similarly, we observed some nascent attempts to develop quality indicators (e.g. for responsiveness and reliability) for departments within the technical support division providing a greater share of services to external customers or being exposed to the threat of outsourcing (e.g. catering and laundry services). These efforts primarily seemed to be locally initiated, or as the divisional manager argued:
We have designed and implemented the quality controls in use ourselves, even though the training provided by the quality department has been of some importance in this respect. The beneficiary-related indicators we use for the kitchen, for example are our own. There has been little focus on developing quality indicators from the quality department.
[It] works more towards the clinical departments.
(Manager of Technical Support Division)
Despite these references to the limited role of the central quality department in ancillary divisions, there were indications of the centrally initiated TQM programme being more consistent with technical than clinical operations. The manager of a clinical division argued that:
It is difficult to define what quality is in a health care setting. In a clinical department, factors like warmth, assistance and individualization of care are important for perceived quality. Such factors are difficult to measure with the production thinking marking much of the work on quality. On the other hand, the work on quality has been a greater success within the technical support and laboratory divisions. Quality of care is more associated with time for dialogue with the patient and is thus linked to staffing. (Manager of Medical Division) This quote mirrors the criticism of the centrally initiated quality improvement efforts noted in the foregoing. Critical comments regarding the external focus of the quality department constituted a common theme among our informants in clinical divisions. One of these argued that 'we have a large quality department, but we don't see much of their work internally . . . they mainly seem to be going to courses and conferences', while another claimed that 'the quality department has grown over our heads . . . it needs to come closer to operations'. There was also some agreement that the barriers to more formalized quality management were reinforced by the implementation mode adopted by the quality department, as illustrated by the following quote:
There has been too little focus on starting quality improvements from the bottom. There has been a lot of resistance due to lack of involvement and misconceptions. That doesn't give credibility.
In addition, there was little evidence of the externally commissioned surveys of patient and staff satisfaction having penetrated into the control systems of clinical divisions. Formal monitoring of quality aspects mainly appeared to pivot around the ability of departments to stay within the nationally established limits for waiting lists and, to a lesser extent, the number of patient complaints. The emphasis on waiting list statistics would seem to be partly institutionally conditioned in a sense that reporting to external constituencies (government agencies) is mandatory and of relatively significant concern at higher organizational levels.
Concluding discussion
Our case findings yield several important insights pertaining to our research question and Oliver's (1991) hypotheses. Regarding the adoption of DRG-based PM by the hospital, we find evidence of both legitimacy-seeking and efficiency-enhancing rationales forming part of senior management's rhetoric. Despite the largely negative experiences from the initial experimenting with DRG-based funding in the early 1990s and the complexities associated with DRG-based PM, it was seen as a superior mechanism to the crude financial indicators previously relied upon for improving financial control of operations as well as legitimization to external constituencies (primarily politicians) by informants at the divisional as well as higher levels. 5 This supports Oliver's (1991) hypotheses regarding the influence of both perceived legitimacy and efficiency gains as determinants of compliance with institutionalized practices. However, a few qualifying remarks, shedding further light on Oliver's framework, are required in this respect.
First, legitimacy-seeking and efficiency-enhancing rationales may be more closely intertwined than acknowledged by Oliver, as reflected by, for example, the General Manager's strong belief that DRGs would improve internal financial control, and his use of this argument as an internal justification of change as well as in his public advocacy role (cf. Sjøstrand, 1997) . This is an example of more pro-active mimicking than is typically associated with acquiescent behaviour and suggests that Oliver might have over-emphasized the passivity of acquiescence as a response where more complex, interwoven rationalities for the adoption of structural attributes emerge (see Abernethy and Chua, 1996 , for similar arguments). However, our findings are at variance with Abernethy and Chua's (1996) assertion that relatively simple and crude financial controls might suffice for legitimization to external constituencies, such as politicians. Instead, we observed extensive efforts to make a highly complex control system operational for internal use alongside conscious attempts to 'sell' the new control practices to important external audiences (see Lowe, 2000 , for similar observations). There is also some consonance between the General Manager's prior initiative to implement a divisional structure and the subsequently enhanced emphasis on financial PM in the organization and the decision to rely more heavily on DRGs to further strengthen financial control. This reinforces the impression of the new PM practices as part of some intentional change initiative resulting in progressively greater technical 'sophistication' in financial control practices.
Second, the pro-active mimicking of the new system of funding is not only conditioned by the causes of the adoption of DRG-based PM. A complementary explanation can be derived by considering the pattern in which these practices are diffused. While the fact that all county councils have mimicked the new funding system vis-à-vis hospitals is an indication of growing institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , central government and the county council in question have taken a cautious approach to the further diffusion of DRGs for internal control within hospitals. Furthermore, we found pioneering managerial efforts to refine DRG-based controls for internal use occurring in a financially stable and seemingly efficient hospital (as indicated by its consistently good performance in DRG-based league tables), possibly as a means of capitalizing on the legitimacy thus conferred on the organization and as a preparation for more far-reaching changes in the system of governance. Taken together, these findings gainsay the prediction that the health care providers most likely to turn DRG-based controls inwards would be financially strained hospitals exposed to coercive pressures to conform with some rationalized efficiency myth (Covaleski et al., 1993) . Consistent with Oliver's (1991) hypotheses, however, our findings indicate that where voluntary diffusion 5 The exception in this respect appears to be managers and controllers in ancillary divisions voicing scepticism towards DRGs for internal control, but embracing their use as a legitimating device (see Section 7).
predominates over coercive pressures, senior management may have considerable discretion to preemptively go beyond institutional demands in anticipation of future benefits rather than slavishly mimic institutional practices imposed by politicians.
Finally, the pro-active efforts to implement DRG-based controls have largely progressed in isolation from the development of non-financial PM reflecting the interests of other important constituencies, such as professional staff and patients. This should be viewed in light of the growing dependence of Norwegian health care institutions on central government, notably manifested by the increasingly centralized control of funding and, most recently, the proposal to transfer ownership of hospitals from county councils to the state. As far as clinical divisions are concerned, the internal reliance on DRG-based controls has accentuated this dependence as their performance is made increasingly and more directly contingent on governmentcontrolled sources of funding. This is mirrored by the relatively one-sided emphasis placed on DRG-based PM and monitoring of other measures requested by various state agencies (e.g. waiting list statistics) within these divisions, while managers and controllers assume a relatively passive role as recipients of information generated by existing, but technically deficient patient and personnel information systems. In addition, the considerable managerial time and efforts required for dealing with the consequences of the implementation of DRG-based control appear to have limited the propensity to initiate improvements in this respect (e.g. the limited attention paid to the new, integrated accounting and personnel information systems). 6 This supports Oliver's (1991) contention that acquiescence to institutional norms espoused by an increasingly dominant constituency limits the possibilities of simultaneously accommodating far-reaching change initiatives reflecting the interest of other constituencies. However, more pro-active experimenting with non-financial PM as complements to budgetary control, was observed in ancillary divisions, which are less directly subjected to institutional pressures associated with the new system of funding but increasingly exposed to external market forces. This suggests that the likelihood of pro-active attempts to develop multidimensional PM is greater where multiple constituencies make their influence felt (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Oliver, 1991) .
These differences between clinical and ancillary divisions do not, however, provide an exhaustive representation of senior management's tactics in dealing with multiple constituency interests. The actions of the General Manager and central administrative departments suggest some additional refinements of Oliver's (1991) framework in this respect.
The criticality of managing professional staff interests in the Norwegian health care sector seems to be increasing, as manifested by the growing recruitment and retention problems and the results of the staff satisfaction survey conducted in 1999. An illuminating episode in this respect is the response of senior management to this survey. The pressures from professional staff, amplified by the attention from the media and politicians, apparently alerted management to the need for legitimacy in the eyes of this constituency as indicated by the measures taken to improve the situation in departments with widespread staff discontent and the growing 6 Similar effects (e.g. the efforts required to deal with national changes in coding practices, the development of a mechanism for internal allocation of DRG-based reimbursements and the effects of the prospective payment system on budgetary overruns) were observed at higher organizational levels (see Section 6).
efforts to develop indicators of staff-related aspects, such as absenteeism and staff turnover. In responding to the public debate following the disclosure of the staff survey report, however, the General Manager did not link the issue of staff discontent and fatigue to the related issue of enhanced political pressure for cost containment, although the possibility of meeting these contrasting priorities was questioned by other actors (e.g. some political parties). Instead, he drew attention to the more specific steps required to improve working conditions. The public debate concerning the staff satisfaction survey did not pivot around the primary symbolic element relied upon by management for legitimating and visualizing the changes in cost management (i.e. the growing use of DRG-based PM). Hence, management was able to, at least temporarily avoid a potentially critical debate regarding the enhanced internal emphasis on financial PM, while initiating more specific programmes aimed at resolving an emerging legitimacy problem, which was threatening to destabilize the organization.
The response to the staff satisfaction survey represents a relatively pro-active attempt to disconnect the contentious issue of enhanced emphasis on financial control from the debate concerning the subsequent effects on performance aspects of greater concern to professional staff. As such, it supports Oliver's (1991) hypothesis regarding compromise through balancing as a likely response to multiple, conflicting constituent interests. However, this balancing also embodies an element of decoupling in the sense that financial performance and concerns with staff discontent are disintegrated in the managerial rhetoric. This is in line with Brignall and Modell's (2000) contention that more pro-active de-coupling of financial and non-financial PM forms a prerequisite for balancing between conflicting constituent interests and suggests that compromise and avoidance tactics may be more intricately intertwined than Oliver (1991) recognizes.
Our findings also cast some light on potential barriers to pro-active managerial manoeuvering in developing multidimensional PM, besides those emanating from the growing dependence on a dominant external constituency, such as central government. Deeply embedded institutional constraints (e.g. differences in status, traditionally entrenched functional barriers) have limited the cooperation between the personnel and finance departments, which currently hampers integration between financial and human resource aspects in the development of PM. Similarly, while the quality department seems to play a more significant role than the personnel department in external legitimacy-seeking, the limited progress in developing quality indicators for more widespread use within clinical divisions should be viewed in light of the problems in legitimating more formalized quality management internally. The approach informing the quality improvement efforts, which bear witness to some mimicking of private sector practices (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997) , is apparently resisted by physicians on grounds that it is largely alien to clinical realities. These findings illustrate how institutional constraints, originating from inconsistent norms and rationalities, effectively contribute to the lack of integration and coherence in PM. While de-coupling between various performance dimensions may occasionally be pro-actively effected by management, as illustrated by the response to the staff satisfaction survey, it emerges as a result of action-stifling conflicts of interest in other circumstances. This suggests that Oliver's (1991) conception of de-coupling as a relatively pro-active tactic may not be universally valid and that the exact nature of this widely discussed response to institutional processes can only be discovered by closely examining it in the specific context in which it occurs (cf. Powell, 1988; Brignall and Modell, 2000) . 7 The present study provides little evidence of the more radical responses to institutional pressures proposed by Oliver (1991) . This is not surprising, since radical change in highly institutionalized fields, such as the Norwegian health care sector, is unusual (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) and may be expected to encounter considerable resistance. One example of this is the difficulties in promoting a quality improvement programme grounded in conceptual notions radically diverging from the institutionalized conception of clinical quality assurance. Nevertheless, the study illustrates the usefulness of Oliver's (1991) framework for analysing in greater detail how managerial responses to institutional pressures translate into the development of multidimensional PM, while suggesting some conceptual refinements in this respect. Judging from our findings, a certain element of pro-active managerial manoeuvering is possible even in highly regulated institutional environments. A limitation of the study is that it was conducted over a relatively short period of time and adopted a narrow focus by examining the responses of primarily one, albeit important, category of organizational actors (senior management). However, it represents a first attempt to study the complex interactions between managerial choices and institutional constraints influencing the development of multidimensional PM, which future research may build on to advance our knowledge of this topic.
